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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 6042
The Nepal Poverty Alleviation Fund is a World Bank 
supported community-driven development program. 
Its objective is to improve rural welfare, particularly for 
groups that have traditionally been excluded for reasons 
of gender, ethnicity, caste, and location. Since its launch 
in 2004, the Fund has covered the 40 poorest districts 
of the country, supported some 15,000 community 
organizations, and benefited more than 2.5 million 
people. This paper attempts to estimate the impact of 
this large-scale program using a randomized phase-
in approach, in which certain localities are randomly 
selected for earlier intervention than others. Using two 
rounds of survey data and a difference-in-difference 
combined with instrumental variable estimation method, 
it finds statistically significant causal impact of the 
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is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development 
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org. The authors may be contacted at dparajuli@worldbank.org.  
program on key welfare outcomes. The treatment-on-
the-treated estimate on real per capita consumption is 19 
percent growth. Other impacts include a 19 percentage 
points decline on incidence of food insecurity (defined 
as food sufficiency for six months or less) and a 15 
percentage points increase in the school enrollment rate 
among 6–15 year-olds. Impacts (positive or negative) 
are yet to be detected on indicators associated with child 
malnutrition, social capital, and empowerment. The 
policy implications of these results should be of interest 
to the government and to development partners in 
determining what may be effective instruments to deliver 
services to marginalized communities in what remains a 
fragile and difficult political environment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Developing countries are increasingly promoting social fund type programs where the focus 
is on community driven development (CDD) approaches to identify livelihood and income 
enhancing activities which are then implemented and financed through these funds. In conflict or 
post-conflict countries, particularly where the root causes of strife are often related to wide 
disparities and inadequate public sector support to the needs of lagging populations,   
governments and development partners often respond to this need through community-based 
poverty alleviation funds (World Bank, 2006). Some examples include Afghanistan National 
Solidarity Program (NSP), Angola Social Action Fund, Colombia Peace and Development 
Project, Indonesia Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PNPM), and Nepal Poverty 
Alleviation Fund. However, there is no consensus on the extent of their effectiveness, in large 
part since rigorous impact evaluations of CDD-type social funds programs, particularly in 
conflict-affected settings, are far less common given and the complexity of operations and 
practical constraints in designing and implementing robust impact assessments. Afghanistan NSP 
(Beath et. al, 2008) and Indonesia PNPM (Olken et. al, 2010) are among the few successfully 
implemented examples.  
 
Nepal Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) is a semi-autonomous government agency, created 
by the Government of Nepal by an Act of Parliament to function as a targeted program of poverty 
alleviation for marginalized and poor households.  The World Bank provides financial and 
technical support to this targeted instrument, in particular to improve living conditions, 
livelihoods and empowerment among the rural poor, with particular attention to groups that have 
traditionally been excluded by reasons of gender, ethnicity, caste and location. Since its launch in 
2004, PAF has covered 40 poorest districts of the country, supporting some 15,000 community 
organizations and benefiting more than 500,000 households, over 2.5 million people, roughly 
10% of the population. The two main interventions in PAF are: (i) income generating activities 
(IG); and (ii) small-scale village and community infrastructure (INF). IG interventions are easily 
the more prevalent ones, taking up more than 80% of resources and more than 90% of sub-
projects.  
 
In this paper we present the design and results of an impact evaluation of the Nepal PAF 
program.  The design involves a randomized phase-in approach, in which certain localities were 
randomly assigned for earlier intervention than others. As expected, there is no perfect 
compliance between the actual treatment and the planned treatment but sufficiently strong for us 
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to identify the causal impact of PAF program on outcomes of interest.  Using two rounds of 
survey data and difference-in-difference combined with instrumental variable estimation method, 
we find that there is a positive and significant “PAF effect” on key welfare indicators.  The 
estimated net program impact on real per capita consumption growth is 19 percent for PAF 
participants. Other impacts include a 19 percentage points decline on incidence of food insecurity 
(as defined as self-reported food sufficiency for six months or less) and 15 percentage points 
increase in school enrollment rate among 6-15 year olds. While improvements in nutrition and 
social empowerment indicators are seen for all groups (treated/untreated), the impact of the PAF 
program on indicators associated with child malnutrition  and indicators of social capital (trust, 
respect, relationships between different ethnic groups within the community) is yet to be detected. 
The policy implications of these results should be of interest to the government and to 
development partners in determining what may be effective instruments to deliver services to 
marginalized communities in what remains a fragile and difficult political environment. 
 
This study contributes to the existing literature on impact evaluation of social fund in a few 
ways. First, we present results of a large-scale intervention using an experimental impact 
evaluation design. Second, we estimate the causal impact even when there is no perfect 
compliance with randomized assignment. Imperfections in randomized evaluations are quite 
reasonable in real world settings of large-scale programs and allowing for such in fact can 
maintain external validity of the impact estimates.  Third, in addition to using per capita 
household consumption, we also report impact on food security and access to education which are 
important indicators of vulnerability in conflict settings.  
 
2. Evaluation Design 
 
PAF Setting: As mentioned earlier, PAF interventions are predominantly income generating 
activities (IGAs), particularly in the initial rounds, since the social cohesion required to motivate 
investments in public goods often takes longer to form, particularly in communities affected by 
conflict. The interventions typically have the following sequencing: 
- PAF and its Partner Organization (PO) – local NGO- select the village in a targeted district 
(PO’s village selection depends on qualitative and quantitative assessment of need and 
feasibility)  
- PO carries our community mobilization in the selected village on possible PAF interventions 
and household participation 
- Community Organizations (CO) are formed with 25-30 households as CO members 
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- CO submits a proposal for an IGA for each household in the CO 
- Each  IGA proposal is then evaluated and, if endorsed, is funded by PAF through a grant to 
the community and the member household implements the IGA 
- IGA composition: 75% are livestock (goats, cows, buffaloes, etc.), 15% small trading/retail 
business (tea shops etc.), 5% vegetable farming, and 5% service sector 
- On average, PAF provides US$ 185 per IGA/household (about $30 per capita). Communities 
typically establish revolving funds from which households borrow for their own IGAs and 
self-regulate. 
 
 
Randomized Experimental Design: A pure randomized control trial (RCT) experiment is 
considered ideal for evaluations. Given the operational setting where PAF interventions are 
community-demand projects and targeted to poorer communities and poorer households within 
those communities, a pure RCT is a difficult proposition. However, budget restrictions for any 
particular year and implementation capacity constraints mean that one could use a randomized 
phase-in approach that randomly assigns certain communities for early phase-in (Gertler et. al, 
2011).  At the time of this evaluation, PAF was being scaled up from its pilot phase to a wider 
geographic coverage. This presented an opportunity to carry out the impact evaluation in 
communities that were going to be intervened in the near future. A two-stage stratified sampling 
procedure was adopted. First, six districts
2
 representing different geographic regions of the 
country were randomly selected from 25 PAF targeted districts. Second, the sampling frame 
consisted of those wards/villages (Primary Sampling Units (PSUs)) in these six districts that were 
not yet intervened but were in a potential pool to be intervened sometime in the future because of 
their poverty ranking. From a list of approximately 1000 such potential villages, 200 
villages/PSUs were randomly selected for the evaluation sample. Allocation across each district 
was based on the district size (number of wards). Of the 200 evaluation villages, 100 were 
randomly assigned for early phase-in and the remaining as control villages. This randomization 
was stratified by district so as to maintain equal proportion of treatment and control PSUs in each 
district. The randomized list, prepared together with the PAF implementing unit in the 
government, was to be provided to the district Partner Organizations (NGOs) which partner with 
local communities/villages to identify PAF intervention proposals.  
 
                                                 
2 Districts: Rautahat (Terai), Rolpa, Dailekh, Doti (Hills) and Humla, Jumla (Mountains). 
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Survey design: A pre-intervention baseline survey was carried out in 2007
3
. The baseline 
involved conducting a census of all households in the selected 200 villages, and the 
administration of a multi-module detailed household questionnaire to randomly sampled 15 
households from each village (total of 3,000 households). The survey questionnaire was adapted 
from the Nepal Living Standards Survey
4
 (NLSS) and included detailed information on 
consumption and income, socio-economic and demographic issues, including education, health 
and nutrition, physical assets, migration and remittances, employment, social environment, 
community relationship, voice and participation. For comparability with the national household 
survey based welfare measures, the PAF survey included a similar consumption module and 
followed the same consumption aggregation method. The follow-up survey, carried out more than 
two years after the baseline, included the same questionnaires from the baseline survey and also 
gathered basic information on the actual treatment status (PAF intervention) and non-treatment 
(control) at both household level and at the village/PSU level. Randomized assignment to early 
phase-in was not followed perfectly, but sufficiently strongly to allow us to identify a suitable 
empirical strategy to report causal impact estimates.  
 
Compliance with Randomization: Table 1 below describes planned treatment status and 
actual treatment status of the sampled villages at the time of the follow-up survey. We note two 
patterns: actual status does not follow random assignment perfectly; however, random assignment 
strongly predicts actual treatment status (72 of the 100 randomly treatment-assigned villages are 
treated at the follow-up survey compared to only 39 from the control-assigned). Imperfect 
compliance with randomized assignment in this evaluation was to be expected given the nature of 
the PAF interventions. As mentioned earlier, PAF makes use of NGOs to initiate community-
based interventions in the rural villages in Nepal. The decision to select a village over another one 
for early phase-in cannot all be enforced through lottery alone. Implementation readiness, 
geography, socio-economic conditions and other factors may contribute towards inability to 
comply with random selection. Allowing the NGOs to implement their work may have resulted in 
imperfect compliance, but it may have helped maintain a certain degree of external validity (the 
extent to which the process and results of the interventions are generalized and replicable 
elsewhere).  For the purpose of evaluation, we consider a village in the treatment status if there is 
a CO in that village supported by the PAF. We also note that not all 15 households (which were 
                                                 
3 Piloting for the impact evaluation was initiated in 2006 in a small sample. The design and implementation of the main 
impact evaluation benefited from lessons learnt from the pilot in term of sampling procedure, survey questionnaire, and 
accessibility of sampled villages for reasons related to weather seasonality and remoteness. 
4 For details on national household surveys, see Nepal Living Standards Surveys (NLSS 1995/96, 2003/04, 2010/11). 
The reports can be found at www.cbs.gov.np   
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randomly selected at the baseline) in any treated village may be direct PAF beneficiaries. We 
follow the approach suggested by Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer (2007).  Within-village
5
 
spillover effects (on outcomes of interests) are plausible for non-beneficiary households in the 
treated villages, and thus consider all households (regardless of their benefit status) in the treated 
village as part of the treatment unit.  
 
Table 1: Actual and Planned treatment status (number of villages) 
 Randomly assigned 
control 
Randomly assigned  treatment 
Actual control  61 28 
Actual treatment  39 72 
Total 100 100 
 
Outcome of interest: The main welfare indicator of PAF impact evaluation is per capita 
consumption. Consumption is considered to be a better measure of welfare than income since it 
captures the family’s expectations of a more permanent change in future income than current 
income alone
6
. Food insecurity is another outcome indicator – given it is one of the key outcome 
indicators for PAF program- and is measured by number of months of food sufficiency for a 
household. We also examine effects on child level opportunities in education and health/nutrition:  
school enrollments rates for 6-15 year olds and malnutrition rates for younger children (Table 2). 
Our analysis also looks at many other dimensions and indicators, most notably those on social 
capital and empowerment.  
 
Table 2: Outcome Indicators for PAF Impact Evaluation 
Dimension Indicators Sample size 
Income/Consumption Real Per capita Household Consumption 3,000 HHs (2,774 panel households) 
Food insecurity 
Proportion of households with food sufficiency of 
6 months or less  
3,000 HHs (2,774 panel households) 
Education School enrollment rate of 6-15 year olds 5,500 children 
Health/Nutrition 
Child Malnutrition (underweight) among children 
under 5 years 
2,300 children  
 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
We start with the “intent-to-treat” estimation specification using the following regression:  
 
(1)         ijtjtjtjijt eXTATAY   *  
 
                                                 
5 Cross-village spillovers are less likely given villages are far from each other.  
6 The PAF monitoring system also collects data on income and other socio-economic characteristics at the household 
level to report on income changes for households assisted by the fund. 
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where Yi denotes outcome of interest for household i, located in village j, at time t. Change 
between baseline and follow-up survey periods in per capita consumption (or some other outcome 
indicator) for household i, A (0,1) denotes random assignment, T (0,1) follow-up time-period. X 
denotes a vector of village-specific geographic and socio-economic characteristics at baseline. 
The coefficient β measures the “intent-to-treat” (ITT) impact of the PAF program, while the 
standard error of the coefficient would provide the statistical significance. Because the treatment 
unit is at the village level, standard errors are clustered at the PSU level. We add X control 
variables to improve statistical power of our estimates (to reduce variance). In sample sizes such 
as ours, this is an important consideration. Data availability at baseline and at follow-up allows us 
to use the difference-in-difference regression as shown in (1). We note that the same regression 
can be run for observations for follow-up period only and still identify the net impact as long as 
the random assignment A ensures that the characteristics and outcomes at the baseline are 
between the two groups.  
 
Intent to treat estimator, however, is less relevant as a parameter of interest for us. One, ITT 
gives a smaller (in magnitude) impact estimate because in the presence of crossover or imperfect 
compliance, not all originally treatment-assigned villages are actually treated and some originally 
control-assigned villages are in fact treated. Two, our primary interest is not so much on the 
impact of random phase-in program but rather the impact of the actual PAF treatment itself. We 
cannot simply compare outcomes in actually treated and not-treated villages since actual 
treatment is endogenous and likely affected by characteristics (such as targeting criteria 
observable or unobservable) that may themselves influence outcomes, leading to selection bias 
(Ravallion, 2005).  
 
Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) impact estimator is one solution to this evaluation problem. 
TOT estimates the impact of the intervention on those whom it was offered and who actually 
received the intervention. In econometric terms, this is an instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
technique, whereby random assignment A of treatment status is used to instrument actual 
treatment status (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). In the first-stage, actual treatment P is regressed 
with random assignment A and other X variables (2).   
 
(2)  jjjj XAP   21  
(3) ijtjtjivtjijt XTPTPY  

*  
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Second-stage regression (3) uses jP

 predicted value of the actual PAF treatment that is 
obtained through a first-stage regression in (2). The coefficient 
iv  from the second-stage IV 
regression is the TOT impact estimate on the outcome of interest. Cluster-corrected standard error 
associated with this coefficient indicates statistical significance. We also correct for the standard 
errors to account for the fact that predicted values, and not the actual values of the P, are used in 
the second-stage regression. To generate consistent estimates of the parameter coefficients and 
their standard errors, we implement the empirical strategy using “ivreg2” command in STATA 
(Baum et al. 2007), with “cluster” option and appropriate specification to account for the 
instrumentation of the interaction term in the model when applicable.  
 
The validity of IV estimation strategy requires that two conditions are met: the instrument is 
exogenous and relevant.  Exogeneity means that the instrument should not be correlated with 
outcomes (except through actual intervention) or with unobserved variables. Relevancy implies 
that the instrument should be correlated with the actual treatment status. The first condition is met 
by construction in our evaluation, since the instrument A is randomly assigned. The second 
condition is met if there is a strong correlation between random assignment A and actual 
treatment status P and this can be tested using the results from the first-stage regression. 
 
4. Results 
 
We start with comparison of baseline outcome variables as well other characteristics 
between the two randomly assigned treatment and control groups. As seen in annex table 1, the 
mean differences between the two types of villages are not statistically different, suggesting that 
the randomization was generally successful.  
 
As described above in section 2 and table 1, actual PAF treatment status for a village did not 
follow random assignment perfectly. However, random assignment strongly predicted actual 
treatment status (72% PAF intervention from the treatment assignment, compared to only 39% 
from the control-assignment, thus a 33% differential take-up). We note that the actual treatment 
status may have additionally been driven by implementation readiness, pressure from a particular 
village, geography, socio-economic conditions and other factors. The first stage regression 
estimates, as presented in annex table 2, confirm that this is indeed the case.  Probability of actual 
PAF intervention is positively associated with random treatment assignment (instrument is 
relevant), “poorest” third of villages as ranked by the NGOs, higher elevation, further distance 
from district headquarter, higher proportion of uneducated households heads, higher proportion of 
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dalit and other disadvantaged households, and higher proportion of landless households. On the 
other hand, it is negatively correlated with higher proportion of households owning radios and 
with higher average age of first marriage for females in the village. These findings are consistent 
with PAF’s objective of targeting the villages that have been traditionally excluded due to 
geography and socio-economic features.  
 
The results of the impact estimation are summarized in table 3 below (detailed results and 
specifications in Annex tables 3-6).  
 
Consumption:  As seen in table 3, the estimated net PAF impact on per capita consumption 
(in real terms adjusted for price inflation) growth is 7 percent for intent-to-treat estimate and 19 
percent for treatment-on-the-treated estimate from instrumental variable regression. The results 
are statistically significant and robust across alternate specifications (such as that using second 
round of data only
7
).  In terms of magnitude, 19 percent change translates to about US$40 
(Rupees 3,000) absolute change in real per capita consumption. In other words, the initial per 
capita investment of $30 from PAF appears to provide more than 130% return in just over two 
years of time. The finding that PAF IG intervention is associated with significant welfare increase 
provides a strong signal to policy makers on the program’s ability to influence development 
objective to reduce poverty.   
 
Table 3: Summary of Impact Estimates  
Outcome Indicator Specification  
Intent-To-Treat 
(ITT)  
Instrumental Variable 
(IV) 
Per capita consumption, 
Log 
Difference-in-Difference  0.071** 0.187** 
Follow-up Round 0.075** 0.196** 
Food Insecurity, food 
sufficient < 6 months  
Difference-in-Difference  -0.071* -0.187* 
Follow-up Round -0.084*** -0.219*** 
School Enrollment, 6-15 
year olds 
Difference-in-Difference, all 0.048** 0.139** 
Difference-in-Difference, girls 0.072** 0.213** 
Underweight status, 0-4 
year olds 
Difference-in-Difference, all -0.018 -0.056 
Difference-in-Difference, girls -0.016 -0.050 
Notes: 1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 2. Statistical significance is derived from standard errors that are corrected 
for clustering at PSU level; 3. There are 200 PSUs in the sample, 3000 Households, 2774 Panel HHs, 5500 6-15 year 
olds, and 2300 0-4 year olds; 4. On panel and non-panel households, there are no statistical differences in baseline 
values of both the outcome variables and other key correlates, suggesting attrition is not a problem in our analysis.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 Because randomization was successful in ensuring comparability in the outcome variables at baseline, one 
can easily estimate the impact using second round observations only for outcome data.   
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Food Insecurity: The analysis estimates that the net PAF impact on incidence of food 
insecurity (as defined as self-reported food sufficiency for six months or less) is a decline of 19 
percentage points  when using a combined IV with difference-and-difference method, and a 
decline of 22 percentage points when using IV on post-treatment data only. The effect is stronger 
for disadvantaged households, such as those from dalit and janajati communities
8
.  The results 
are significant since chronic food insecurity is a particularly important concern in Nepal and 
substantial amounts are spent per year on public works programs aimed at alleviating hardship for 
food insecure households. Sustained food price inflation remains a concern and an estimated 3.7 
million people are currently food insecure.  The impact of high prices and food insecurity is most 
severe on economically, geographically and socially marginalized communities. Since Nepal’s 
poorest households spend more than 75% of their income on food, high prices will continue to 
affect poverty alleviation efforts. The strong impact demonstrated by this evaluation suggests that 
the PAF is an effective program to address food insecurity. 
 
School Enrollment:  School participation among 6-15 year old children also appears to have 
been significantly affected by PAF interventions.  The impact estimate is an increase of 14 
percentage points in school enrollment for all children in the given age-group but girls appear to 
have benefited even more, with 21 percentage points net increase. The effects are as strong 
among children from disadvantaged caste/ethnic groups. These are all notable and statistically 
significant impacts.  While child education is not a direct outcome associated with PAF 
intervention, one can think of at least two ways by which a treated household would change its 
behavior in relation to this outcome. First, actual or perceived positive change in 
income/consumption for a household is more likely to reduce potential constraints of sending a 
child to school.  Second, community mobilization and social-networking, as part of the PAF 
community organization (CO), may produce spillover effects such as motivating households 
towards child schooling.  
 
Child Underweight:  Close to 60% of children from sampled villages are underweight 
(annex table 1)
9
. We find that there is no statistically significant impact on child underweight 
rates. However, one can take this as a step in the right direction as shown by the negative sign of 
the coefficient, a pointer to possible effects in the coming years. Child malnutrition is a serious 
problem in the country, particularly among children from the poorest communities.  
                                                 
8
 Separate estimate for households belonging to Dalit, Janajatis and other caste/ethnic groups (other than 
Brahmin, Chhetris and Newars) shows a higher decline in food insecurity (24 percentage points).  
9
 Data from Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) indicates similar incidence of underweight in 
Midwestern development region.  
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Other Indicators: We also explore the possible impact on other indicators associated with 
social capital (trust, respect, relationships between different ethnic groups, community disputes, 
etc.) and female empowerment/decision-making. The analysis does not find any significant 
impact over the 2 year period of the evaluation.  
 
Direct effects and Spillover effects: The two main reasons for using villages as units of our 
analysis are: random phase-in is much more feasible across villages as opposed to individual 
households, and village-level randomization is a better option in presence of possible spillover 
effects. In the case of PAF intervention, the treatment villages have both direct beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries.   Through social and economic interactions, non-treated households in the 
treatment villages may potentially be affected by PAF grants to treated households in the same 
villages. For example, if there is sharing of such grants among relatives or if increased demand 
for goods/services among treated households affects either earnings or prices faced by non-treated 
households, spillover (indirect) effects are plausible. Using a method suggested in Banerjee et al. 
(2007), we find that spillover effects are small and the net program impact is mostly driven by 
direct effects on the treated households.  When we consider individual households as units of 
analysis, the magnitude of the net impact of PAF, for instance, on per capita consumption is about 
38 percent change, close to double that of the estimate using villages as units of analysis
10
. This 
suggests that the impact estimates that we present in this paper using village level analysis are in 
fact lower bound estimates. Moreover, the lack of indirect effects and the dominance of direct 
effects also imply that the household level targeting in the PAF program is justified.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The primary objective of this study is to evaluate the impact of Nepal Poverty Alleviation 
Fund on rural household welfare. PAF is a CDD-type social fund program and currently covers 
40 poorest districts in Nepal, with plans to expand across the country. Between 2004 and 2011, 
PAF has supported some 15,000 Community Organizations and benefited more than 2.5 million 
people directly. Establishing causal effect of such a complex operation is difficult, particularly in 
a country setting where designing and implementing a robust impact assessment are not the norm. 
The Government took the initiative to build an impact evaluation component into the program 
and collaborated with an external research institution (Tribhuvan University) and a technical team 
from the World Bank to implement it.  
                                                 
10
 This is consistent with the findings from earlier version of this paper that considered individual 
households as units of analysis, where treated households were compared with non-treated households.  
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The identification of the PAF impact is based on a design that involves a randomized phase-
in approach, in which certain localities were randomly assigned for earlier intervention than 
others. Not surprisingly, the actual PAF intervention does not perfectly comply with the random 
assignment. However, there is a strong correlation of planned and actual intervention status.  
Using two rounds of survey data (pre and post-intervention) and difference-in-difference 
combined with instrumental variable estimation method, we find significant PAF effect on key 
welfare indicators.  The treatment-on-the-treated impact is 19 percent growth on real per capita 
consumption is, 19 percentage points decline on incidence of food insecurity (defined as food 
sufficiency for six months or less) and 15 percentage points increase in school enrollment rate 
among 6-15 year olds. Impacts (positive or negative) are yet to be detected on indicators 
associated with child malnutrition, social capital and female empowerment. The policy 
implications of these results should be of interest to the government and to development partners 
in determining what may be effective instruments to deliver services to marginalized 
communities in what remains a fragile and difficult political environment.   
 
The study contributes to evidence on social funds evaluation in three ways. We use an 
experimental design to evaluate the impact of a large-scale intervention. Moreover, we estimate 
the causal impact even when there is no perfect compliance between the actual intervention and 
the randomized assignment. Imperfect compliance is a reasonable real world setting and 
allowance for such can be deemed to maintain external validity of the impact estimates.  Lastly, 
in addition to using per capita household consumption, we also report impact on food security, an 
important indicator of vulnerability in conflict settings.  
 
Like most evaluations, our study has its limitations. First, the treatment-on-the-treated 
instrumental variable estimate does not necessarily represent the average treatment effect for the 
entire population, but only of the sub-population that was actually treated because of random 
assignment. This is a well-documented qualification of the IV method. Second, our analysis has 
focused on the outcome indicators only but there are important process related questions that this 
impact evaluation does not yet answer.  For example, while we do not find any statistically 
significant impact on social capital and female empowerment, project documents including socio-
economic surveys of assisted households at baseline and currently suggest that women have 
greater control over their earnings and make  more diversified investments than men.  Seventy-
four percent of all PAF members are women.  Future evaluation should carefully explore these 
relationships.  
13 
 
 
Finally, the household-level panel data provide an opportunity for further analysis over time 
which may help us understand changes in poverty dynamics and for further counterfactual 
analysis of the outcomes reported in this paper.  As such, a continuation of the survey 
methodology and of the impact evaluation analysis would be an important tool for policy makers 
and for the implementation of the poverty alleviation fund at the national level. 
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Annex Table 1: Baseline Means of Key Variables and Differences Between Assigned Treatment and Control  
 
Assigned Treatment Assigned Control 
p-Value for 
difference 
Per Capita consumption, 2007 NRS 14863 14866 0.996 
Per Capita consumption, log 9.512 9.512 0.988 
Food sufficiency, # months 8.055 7.88 0.480 
Food poor, food sufficient for less than 6 months 0.364 0.385 0.493 
Enrollment rate, 6-15 year olds 0.726 0.735 0.731 
Underweight rate, 0-4 year olds 0.578 0.582 0.872 
Household Size 5.877 5.843 0.792 
Female Headed HH 0.108 0.117 0.577 
Dalit or other disadvantaged HH 0.381 0.400 0.708 
Land value, log 4.665 4.545 0.232 
Receives remittance 0.141 0.149 0.695 
Poorest third of VDCs by PAF ranking                 0.500 0.520 0.775 
mean elevation ('000m) above sea level, vdc         1.371 1.489 0.485 
Distance, km, to DHQ                                19.463 21.728 0.086 
%Operated Agri area<0.1Ha,ward                      0.179 0.193 0.561 
%15+ pop with no education, ward 0.740 0.755 0.529 
Notes: 1. Sample size: 3,000 HHs from 200 PSUs; 2. P-Value is generated from regressions of each variable on assigned treatment 
group (0,1) and standard error corrected for clustering at the PSU level 
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Annex Table 2: First Stage Regression in the IV regression 
 
Dependent Variable: Actual PAF Intervention (1,0) 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
                                        Co-efficient 
(standard error) 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Intent-to-treat(IV)                                0.382*** 
                                                 (0.059)    
Poorest third of VDCs by PAF rank (1,0)            0.141**  
                                                 (0.060)    
mean elevation ('000m) above sea level, vdc        0.274*** 
                                                 (0.036)    
mean slope (as %), vdc                            -0.006*   
                                                 (0.003)    
Distance, km, to DHQ                               0.003    
                                                 (0.003)    
%Operated Agri area<0.1Ha,ward                     0.400**  
                                                 (0.186)    
%15+ pop with no education, ward                   0.136    
                                                 (0.195)    
%dalit & other disadvantaged H, ward               0.044    
                                                 (0.125)    
%HH Head of Hindu Religion, ward                   0.071    
                                                 (0.143)    
%HH Head Nepali mother tongue, ward               -0.044    
                                                 (0.139)    
Average age of females at 1st marriage,vdc        -0.100*** 
                                                 (0.036)    
%own radio, ward                                  -0.249**  
                                                 (0.116)    
Constant                                           1.704**  
                                                 (0.694)    
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: 1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 2.Standard errors are corrected for clustering 
at PSU level; 3. There are 200 PSUs in the sample 
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Annex Table 3: Impact Estimation for Per Capita Consumption (log) 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                     (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                                            DIFF-IN-DIFF    DIFF-IN-DIFF      Second Round    Second Round 
                                              Intent-to-treat       IV        Intent-to-treat       IV                
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Intent-to-treat                                    0.071**                         0.075**                  
                                                 (0.033)                         (0.030)                    
PAF IG Village                                                     0.187**                         0.196**  
                                                                 (0.091)                         (0.082)    
1=Poorest third of VDCs by PAF rank               -0.075**        -0.102***       -0.028          -0.056*   
                                                 (0.033)         (0.036)         (0.028)         (0.030)    
mean elevation ('000m) above sea level, vdc        0.028          -0.023           0.160***        0.107*** 
                                                 (0.028)         (0.037)         (0.025)         (0.033)    
mean slope (as %), vdc                             0.006***        0.007***       -0.003*         -0.002    
                                                 (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)    
Distance, km, to DHQ                               0.005***        0.005***        0.003**         0.003*   
                                                 (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)    
%Operated Agri area<0.1Ha,ward                    -0.193*         -0.268**         0.145           0.067    
                                                 (0.099)         (0.111)         (0.110)         (0.118)    
%15+ pop with no education, ward                  -0.158          -0.183*         -0.288***       -0.315*** 
                                                 (0.106)         (0.110)         (0.106)         (0.114)    
%dalit&other disad, ward                           0.108           0.100          -0.145**        -0.154*** 
                                                 (0.067)         (0.068)         (0.059)         (0.055)    
%HH Head of Hindu Religion, ward                   0.257***        0.244***        0.125*          0.112    
                                                 (0.079)         (0.082)         (0.071)         (0.073)    
%HH Head Nepali mother tongue, ward               -0.326***       -0.317***       -0.261***       -0.252*** 
                                                 (0.081)         (0.087)         (0.065)         (0.068)    
Average age of females at 1st marriage,vdc         0.028           0.047**         0.023           0.043**  
                                                 (0.020)         (0.023)         (0.017)         (0.021)    
%own radio, ward                                  -0.130*         -0.083          -0.089          -0.040    
                                                 (0.070)         (0.073)         (0.070)         (0.071)    
Constant                                          -0.675*         -0.994**         9.212***        8.879*** 
                                                 (0.363)         (0.422)         (0.319)         (0.391)    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                                        2774            2774            2999            2999    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: 1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 2. Standard errors shown in parentheses are corrected for 
clustering at PSU level; 3. There are 200 PSUs in the sample 
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Annex Table 4: Impact Estimation for Food Insecurity, Food sufficiency less than 6 months 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                     (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                                            DIFF-IN-DIFF    DIFF-IN-DIFF      Second Round    Second Round 
                                              Intent-to-treat       IV        Intent-to-treat       IV     --
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Intent-to-treat                                   -0.071*                         -0.084***                 
                                                 (0.039)                         (0.027)                    
PAF IG Village                                                    -0.187*                         -0.219*** 
                                                                 (0.101)                         (0.078)    
1=Poorest third of VDCs by PAF rank               -0.087**        -0.061           0.008           0.039    
                                                 (0.040)         (0.041)         (0.029)         (0.032)    
mean elevation ('000m) above sea level, vdc        0.006           0.057          -0.011           0.049    
                                                 (0.026)         (0.038)         (0.021)         (0.033)    
mean slope (as %), vdc                            -0.001          -0.002          -0.002          -0.004**  
                                                 (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)    
Distance, km, to DHQ                               0.001           0.001          -0.002          -0.002    
                                                 (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.001)    
%Operated Agri area<0.1Ha,ward                     0.003           0.078           0.048           0.136    
                                                 (0.122)         (0.121)         (0.098)         (0.104)    
%15+ pop with no education, ward                   0.111           0.136           0.281***        0.312*** 
                                                 (0.116)         (0.118)         (0.092)         (0.095)    
%dalit&other disad, ward                          -0.025          -0.016           0.152**         0.162**  
                                                 (0.088)         (0.083)         (0.068)         (0.066)    
%HH Head of Hindu Religion, ward                  -0.126          -0.113          -0.013           0.003    
                                                 (0.097)         (0.094)         (0.071)         (0.072)    
%HH Head Nepali mother tongue, ward                0.119           0.111           0.107*          0.097    
                                                 (0.092)         (0.091)         (0.064)         (0.063)    
Average age of females at 1st marriage,vdc        -0.039          -0.058**         0.017          -0.005    
                                                 (0.025)         (0.026)         (0.020)         (0.021)    
%own radio, ward                                   0.037          -0.009           0.053          -0.001    
                                                 (0.083)         (0.079)         (0.060)         (0.067)    
Constant                                           0.700           1.019**        -0.093           0.278    
                                                 (0.478)         (0.492)         (0.387)         (0.419)    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                                        2774            2774            2999            2999    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: 1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 2.Standard errors shown in parentheses are corrected for 
clustering at PSU level; 3. There are 200 PSUs in the sample 
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Annex Table 5: Impact Estimation for School Enrollment, 6-15 year olds 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                     (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)    
     Intent-to-treat  IV  IV IV (Girls) IV (Girls) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Intent-to-treat*Round2                             0.048**                                                                  
                                                 (0.019)                                                                    
PAF Village*Round2                                                 0.139**         0.145**         0.213**         0.208**  
                                                                 (0.060)         (0.060)         (0.085)         (0.086)    
Intent-to-treat                                   -0.030                                                                    
                                                 (0.025)                                                                    
PAF IG Village                                                    -0.087          -0.111**        -0.038          -0.081    
                                                                 (0.070)         (0.055)         (0.092)         (0.075)    
Round2                                             0.050***       -0.001          -0.005           0.001          -0.000    
                                                 (0.014)         (0.034)         (0.034)         (0.051)         (0.052)    
Age                                                                                0.002                          -0.008*** 
                                                                                 (0.002)                         (0.002)    
Female                                                                            -0.119***                                 
                                                                                 (0.009)                                    
1=Poorest third of VDCs by PAF rank                                                0.009                           0.004    
                                                                                 (0.016)                         (0.023)    
mean elevation ('000m) above sea level, vdc                                       -0.008                          -0.022    
                                                                                 (0.016)                         (0.023)    
mean slope (as %), vdc                                                             0.002***                        0.002*   
                                                                                 (0.001)                         (0.001)    
Distance, km, to DHQ                                                               0.002*                          0.001    
                                                                                 (0.001)                         (0.001)    
%Operated Agri area<0.1Ha,ward                                                     0.103*                          0.090    
                                                                                 (0.054)                         (0.081)    
%15+ pop with no education, ward                                                  -0.199***                       -0.310*** 
                                                                                 (0.052)                         (0.072)    
%dalit&other disad, ward                                                          -0.026                          -0.022    
                                                                                 (0.047)                         (0.059)    
%HH Head of Hindu Religion, ward                                                   0.125**                         0.088    
                                                                                 (0.048)                         (0.060)    
%HH Head Nepali mother tongue, ward                                                0.040                           0.067    
                                                                                 (0.044)                         (0.060)    
Average age of females at 1st marriage,vdc                                         0.006                           0.019    
                                                                                 (0.009)                         (0.014)    
%own radio, ward                                                                   0.096***                        0.120*** 
                                                                                 (0.029)                         (0.043)    
Constant                                           0.752***        0.785***        0.584***        0.675***        0.426    
                                                 (0.016)         (0.039)         (0.178)         (0.053)         (0.259)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                                       10990           10990           10990            5360            5360    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: 1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 2.Standard errors shown in parentheses are corrected for clustering at PSU level; 
3. There are 200 PSUs in the sample 
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Annex Table 6: Impact Estimation for Child Underweight, 0-4 year olds 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                     (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)    
     Intent-to-treat  IV  IV IV (Girls) IV (Girls) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Intent-to-treat*Round2                            -0.018                                                                    
                                                 (0.034)                                                                    
PAF Village*Round2                                                -0.056          -0.053          -0.050          -0.041    
                                                                 (0.105)         (0.104)         (0.125)         (0.124)    
Intent-to-treat                                    0.004                                                                    
                                                 (0.026)                                                                    
PAF IG Village                                                     0.012           0.038           0.036           0.041    
                                                                 (0.077)         (0.072)         (0.090)         (0.087)    
Round2                                            -0.029          -0.005          -0.006          -0.026          -0.027    
                                                 (0.023)         (0.061)         (0.061)         (0.076)         (0.076)    
Age(months)                                                                        -0.000                           0.000    
                                                                                 (0.000)                         (0.001)    
Female                                                                            -0.026*                                   
                                                                                 (0.014)                                    
1=Poorest third of VDCs by PAF rank                                                0.032*                          0.039*   
                                                                                 (0.018)                         (0.024)    
mean elevation ('000m) above sea level, vdc                                        0.008                          -0.001    
                                                                                 (0.019)                         (0.021)    
mean slope (as %), vdc                                                             0.002                           0.001    
                                                                                 (0.001)                         (0.001)    
Distance, km, to DHQ                                                              -0.001                          -0.002    
                                                                                 (0.001)                         (0.001)    
%Operated Agri area<0.1Ha,ward                                                     0.038                           0.006    
                                                                                 (0.065)                         (0.079)    
%15+ pop with no education, ward                                                   0.162**                         0.187**  
                                                                                 (0.064)                         (0.092)    
%dalit&other disad, ward                                                           0.011                           0.013    
                                                                                 (0.042)                         (0.053)    
%HH Head of Hindu Religion, ward                                                   0.045                           0.041    
                                                                                 (0.050)                         (0.066)    
%HH Head Nepali mother tongue, ward                                                0.007                           0.047    
                                                                                 (0.044)                         (0.052)    
Average age of females at 1st marriage,vdc                                         0.008                           0.001    
                                                                                 (0.013)                         (0.016)    
%own radio, ward                                                                  -0.043                          -0.042    
                                                                                 (0.039)                         (0.049)    
Constant                                           0.587***        0.583***        0.236           0.565***        0.325    
                                                 (0.018)         (0.044)         (0.238)         (0.056)         (0.289)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                                        4549            4549            4549            2251            2251    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: 1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 2.Standard errors shown in parentheses are corrected for clustering at PSU level; 
3. There are 200 PSUs in the sample 
 
